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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The island of Cyprus has been physically divided between its Greek and
Turkish communities since 1974. Its unresolved political status has been a constant
problem in the international community as well as for the people of the island.
Since the division of Cyprus many initiatives have been undertaken to resolve
the dispute. Most have failed to produce results. One of the most visible exceptions to
this was the successful negotiation and cooperation between the Greek Cypriot and
the Turkish Cypriot municipalities of the divided city Nicosia, the capital of the
island. The Nicosia Master Plan came into action after the successful cooperation of
completing the first phase of a sewage system in divided Nicosia in 1979. After the
division in 1974 there was a pressing need for a sewage system in the city. “The
health hazards did not recognize any boundaries therefore it was inevitable to solve
this problem.” (Akinci, interview) After a rather quick completion and
implementation of the sewage system, the mayors of the North and South Nicosia
envisioned the needs of a divided city at the time, as well as, the needs of a unified
city in the future. With the vision of a united city they worked on a joint master plan
of the city in order to stop the unplanned development and the inevitable
deterioration created by the division.
Although this successful cooperation had not solved what is know as the
Cyprus Problem, it proved that a successful cooperation is possible when the
conditions permit. Today, the Greek Cypriot administration has completed
negotiations with the European Union and officially the Greek Cypriot side will be
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an EU country on May 1, 2004. Without a solution between the two sides, the future
EU membership will only benefit the Greek Cypriot community who lives in the
South part of the island and who is the only recognized government on the island.
The EU would provide major economic, social and political benefits to the both
communities but more so to the Turkish Cypriot side which is less developed and
more in need for an economic and a political stability. The Greek Cypriot side’s
benefit would be the possible solution of the conflict and a political stability on the
island and in the region. Consequently, there are many incentives on both sides to
succeed.
This thesis will examine the process that was used to develop the Nicosia
Master Plan to determine whether any of the factors that allowed it to be successful
can be used to facilitate the process that needs to occur between the Greek Cypriot
and the Turkish Cypriot leaderships in regard to the future status of Cyprus in the
European Union.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
History of Cyprus Problem
Cyprus is located in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, about 40 miles (64 km) south of
Turkey, 60 miles (97 km) west of Syria, and 480 miles (772 km) southeast of Greece.
Its maximum length from Cape Arnauti in the west to Cape Apostolos Andreas at the
end of the northeast peninsula is 140 miles (225 km). The maximum north-south
extent is 60 miles (97 km). With an area of 3,572 square miles (9,251 square km), it
is the third largest Mediterranean island after Sicily and Sardinia.
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The history of Cyprus can be better understood if studied against the
background of its geographic setting. Its successive rulers include the Egyptians,
Greeks, Assyrians, Persians, Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, Franks, Venetians,
Ottomans and British. The Turkish Cypriots and the Greeks Cypriots existed
simultaneously on the island since 1571. In 1570 Ottoman landed in Cyprus and
seized Nicosia but to the sultan, Cyprus was an unimportant province. In 1878, the
Ottoman Empire leased the island to Britain while it remained under Turkish
sovereignty. Britain’s aim in occupying Cyprus was to secure a base in the eastern
Mediterranean for the oil in the Middle East. In 1914 the Britain annexed the island
and Cyprus remained a British colony until 1960. There were purely Greek Cypriot,
Turkish Cypriot and mixed villages in all regions. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots
do not share the same language, religion, neither historical nor ethnic background.
Although the two sides could not establish a Cypriot nation they identify themselves
as Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, different than their fellow motherlands,
Turkey and Greece.
The Greek Cypriot population, who from the start expected the British
colonialists to transfer Cyprus to Greece, initially welcomed British occupation. The
demand for enosis (union with Greece) was opposed by Turkish Cypriots, which
created a major division on the island’s politics. In 1947 the governor of Cyprus in
accordance with the British Labor Party’s declaration on colonial policy published
proposals for greater self-government. The Greek Cypriots in favor of the slogan
‘enosis only enosis’ rejected them. In 1955, Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Grivas, a
Greek Cypriot who had served in the Greek Army, began a concerted campaign for
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enosis with the support of the Greek nationalists. In 1955, Grivas formed an
underground guerilla organization, E.O.K.A (National Organization of Cypriot
Struggle), which took up arms against the colonial power. They bombed public
buildings and killed both British and Greek Cypriot opponents of enosis, which in
later stages targeted the Turkish Cypriots as well. In 1956 self-government proposals
came from Britain and again it was rejected and attacks continued. In contrast to
Greek Cypriot sentiment, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey wanted the British rule to
continue. If the British left they wanted the island to be returned back to its owner,
Turkey, or partitioned. Public opinion in Turkey and Greece supported the two
communities resulting in riots and the exclusion of Greek residents in Turkey. The
two sides reached no solution with frequent visits to the United Nations.
In 1959 Greek and Turkish governments reached an agreement on creating an
independent republic in Cyprus, which was accepted by the British government and
the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. In 1960 Cyprus
became an independent republic and became the 99th member of the United Nations.
Greece, Turkey and Britain guaranteed the independence, integrity and security of the
republic. They all had the right to station military forces on the island. The
agreements provided for a division of power along communal lines. The president of
the republic was a Greek Cypriot, Archbishop Makarios, and the Vice president was
a Turkish Cypriot, Dr. Fazil Kucuk. Since the population in 1960 was 80% Greek
Cypriot and 20% Turkish Cypriot, in the constitution they agreed on representation
on a basis of 70% -30% ratios between the respective communities. In 1963 the two
sides’ partnership in the new government came to an end because the Greek Cypriots
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wanted to make some changes to the Constitution and the Turkish Cypriots did not
agree with it. In 1963 inter-communal clashes began and the Turkish Cypriot
participation in the joint government came to an end. This was followed by civil
unrest between the two sides and turned into an inevitable ethnic cleansing process
by the Greek Cypriots toward Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots moved, in
some cases willingly and in other cases by force, from rural areas and mixed villages
into protected enclaves in which Archbishop Makarios’s authority did not reach. The
capital city Nicosia was divided by a cease-fire line and became known as the ‘Green
Line’ that was policed by British troops. The Turkish Cypriots established a
transitional administration to govern their affairs until the provisions of the
Constitution were fully implemented. In March 1964 the UN Security Council sent a
multinational peacekeeping force to Cyprus. Originally this force was authorized to
be there only for three months; however, they are still there today. This indicates that
a resolution to the Cyprus Problem was not expected to take 40 years.
In 1967, a military junta took over power in Athens and targeted to get rid of
the Greek Cypriot President Makarios, who was not in harmony with the existing
regime in Greece. Greek troops (junta) and the Greek controlled Greek Cypriot
National Guard staged a bloody coup that brought to power an extreme pro-enosis,
radical, right-wing, anti-Turkish regime. Bulent Ecevit, then Prime Minister of
Turkey, dispatched troops to the North in response to the coup attempt to merge the
island with Greece using Turkey’s guarantor power over Cyprus. (Boulton and
Hadjipapas 2001). Both sides have different interpretations of this historical date; for
the Turkish Cypriots it is a peace operation whereas for the Greek Cypriots, this is
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the Turkish invasion or occupation. With the collapse of the Greek junta, talks
started in Geneva to stabilize the island. Meanwhile, the Turkish Army conducted a
second military operation and seized one third of the island. The talks did not bring
any solution to the problem; the island still remains under a Cease-Fire agreement
today. People from both sides could not return to their homes and became refuges.
The North became the new home of the Turkish Cypriots and the South went to the
Greek Cypriots.
The Greek Cypriot side had retained the 1960 Constitution (that was
dissolved in 1963) although all provisions relating to the participation of the Turkish
Cypriot community in the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial powers are
no longer applied (EU website). With the exception of Turkey, the Greek Cypriot
administration in the south is recognized by the international community as the only
legitimate government in Cyprus. Meanwhile the North declared her government on
November 15, 1983 to be recognized only by Turkey. Today, there is a fence running
down the entire length of Cyprus from east to west dividing the two communities.
The same fence also runs down the middle of Nicosia with the northern part of the
city serving as the capital of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the
southern part serving as the capital of the Republic of Cyprus. The fence represents
division forcing the two sides to live in total isolation from one another.
Greek Cypriots applied for membership in the European Union in July 1990.
In 1993 the European Union Commission concluded that the application was made in
the name of the whole island. In 1995, the General Affairs Council Conclusion
confirmed Cyprus’ suitability for membership and established that accession
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negotiations with Cyprus would start in 1998. The Turkish Cypriots were invited to
be included in the Cypriot delegation under the government of the Republic of
Cyprus however they refused. This is because the European Union was negotiating
with the Greek Cypriots as the only recognized side and they were not recognizing
the Turkish Cypriot side as a separate delegation of their state, Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus. The talks, to unite the island, continued on different levels with no
avail. In August 1998, Turkish Cypriot President, Rauf R. Denktas, proposed
confederation and demanded recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
before resuming negotiations towards a settlement (Pearce 1999). This demand was
not welcomed by either the Greek side or by the EU, leading to another dead-end. On
the other side, substantial negotiations for the adoption and the implementation of the
EU legislation were completed on April 16, 2003.
Bicommunal talks between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders
took place with the initiations of the UN until December 2000 when President
Denktas announced his withdrawal from the talks, with Turkey’s consent.
Considering it was not leading to what he was prepared to accept as a solution that
being two separate sovereign independent states that were loosely connected. In
December 2001, the Turkish Cypriot president Rauf Denktas and the former Greek
Cypriot President Glafkos Kleridis met face-to-face again.
While the two sides were continuing negotiations, the Republic of Cyprus, in
the name of the whole island, was simultaneously fulfilling the requirements for EU
accession. In accordance with the roadmap of the European Commission endorsed by
the European Council the negotiations ended at the end of 2002 and Cyprus would be
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ready to be part of the first wave of acceding countries in 2004. One very important
anecdote is to acknowledge the close relationship between North Cyprus and Turkey
especially after the declaration of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. “The North
has become a backwater appended to Turkey, something between a free state and a
province” (Munur, 2001). Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission,
visited Nicosia in October 2001 and said that Cyprus would be among the group of
entrants expected to join in 2004.
The Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides, one of the founding
fathers of the European Union has said “if one cannot solve a problem, one can
change the context of the problem so it can be solved. And this applies in the
question of Cyprus” (Kasoulides 2001). European Union envisage that progress
towards EU membership by the Greek Cypriot part of the island and a viable solution
to the problem would mutually reinforce each other and that accession would
contribute to bringing peace and reconciliation to the island (Pearce 1999).
The Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit spelled out for the first time on
November 4, 2001, that Turkey would annex the northern part of Cyprus if the Greek
Cypriot government in Nicosia takes the divided island into the European Union. In
response, Greece said that they would veto accession of the other countries if Cyprus
were not one of them. Amidst all this action, as of December 4, 2001, a new
momentum had started in the history of the Cyprus Problem. The EU timetable had
been a pressing issue. A solution had been expected to come about by the end of
2002 but talks failed once again.
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UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, presented a new peace plan to leaders of
the divided island on November 11, 2002, which was hoped to form the basis for a
reunification agreement before an EU summit in Copenhagen on December 12 was to
set an accession date for Cyprus. The Secretary General urged the negotiators to
work toward meeting the deadline that was extended to March 7, 2003. That would
allow the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to schedule a referendum for March
30, 2003 to approve a settlement in time for a reunified Cyprus to sign the EU treaty
accession on April 16, 2003. Kofi Annan warned that any delay beyond March 7
would hinder the prospect of a unified Cyprus signing the treaty (Western Policy
website). On March 11, the Secretary General announced that they reached the end of
the road, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas was not prepared to agree on a
referendum on the UN plan and raised fundamental objections to basic points in the
revised plan. The Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos said that he was
prepared to put the peace proposal to a referendum and accepted the plan as a base
for negotiation. As a result the Greek Cypriot President signed an accession
agreement with the EU on behalf of the whole island but the Turkish Cypriot side
will be kept out of the block if no solution is found by May 2004.
Denktas’s non-negotiating attitude was not welcomed by the Turkish Cypriots
whose right to vote in a referendum for their future was stolen from them when
Denktash said “No” to public referendum. In reaction, the Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktas announced that he would lift the travel restrictions across the island. The
divided North and South Cyprus would be opened on April 23 2003. After 29 years
they were going to be able to go to the ‘other side’ and visit the homes they left. On
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the first day of the crossing more than 100,000 people traveled to the other side. The
Turkish Cypriots side held parliament elections in December 2003. The opposition
parties agreed that if they were elected they would continue the negotiations with the
Greek Cypriots side towards unifying the island before the EU accession in May
2004.
In addition to the political circles’ efforts, for many years there had been
ongoing efforts by the international peace builders, scholars and mediators to bring
together different sectors of people from both sides for confidence building, and
conflict resolution trainings and workshops in order to create sustainable peace on the
island but most importantly peace among communities. In the light of the recent
developments the need for the two communities to interact and get familiar with each
other’s similarities and differences became greater.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Starting in 1978, the visionary mayors of the divided city of Nicosia
Lellos Demitriades and Mustafa Akinci formed a team of experts to spur the
completion of a joint sewage system for Nicosia, the construction of which
was interrupted by the hostilities in 1974. The success of this effort led them
to creation of a joint force that would develop a Nicosia Master Plan, a
development blueprint dealing with all aspects of life in city that both men
hoped would soon be re-united under a single government comprised of
separate ethnic zones. Architects, city planners, sociologists and economists
met regularly during the 1980’s and 1990’s in order to develop a scheme for
developing business districts, housing areas, parks, and even traffic patterns
(Broome 1998).
The divided capital of Cyprus, Nicosia, inhabits two communities. On the
North of the dividing Green Line the Turkish Cypriot community and on the South of
the Green Line the Greek Cypriot community has been living separately for 30 years.
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Where there is an ongoing conflict in any given region it is not likely to see
cooperation and agreement towards a common goal. A feeling of patriotism and
nationalism overshadows the needs of the cities and citizens in many cases. In the
case of Nicosia, the city’s need for a sewage system at first, and then for an
infrastructure, put the two mayors of the city at work for the betterment of their city
and citizens.
Torgovnik (1990:137) analyzes the central-local parallel planning in
Jerusalem. He analyzes the conflict, the major actors and the 1968 Master Plan. This
chapter shows the different elements between the Nicosia Master Plan and the
Jerusalem Master Plan, including the different visions and motivations behind it and
the different end results. Torgovnik suggests that master planning generally involves
low conflict and is likely to elicit a high level of agreement among professional and
political elites. Master Planning has built-in flexibility and assures contestants that
their views are heard and that their values are represented or can be incorporated. On
the other hand, he suggests that parallel planning involves competition of interests,
intense action and conflict. It is uncertain in regard of goals; its major concern is the
quick translation of planning to implementation (Torgovnik 1990:137).
In 1919, the MacLean plan was the first major planning effort for Jerusalem,
followed by a second plan in 1923, a Halliday plan in 1934 and Kendall plan in 1945,
all evolved under the British Mandate and focused on the Old City. In 1948 the state
of Israel was established. In 1949 the city of Jerusalem was divided by barbed wire
with the Old City under Jordanian control and the western part under Israel’s. Despite
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the difficulties of a divided city, the planning for the Israeli part of Jerusalem
continued.
Before the 1967 Six Day War, the local planning authorities drew up a master
plan viewing it as an opportunity for special urban planning. Jerusalem’s importance
as a holy city, assured the national government’s involvement in the planning. The
master plan prepared by the municipality was guided by a steering committee
comprised of representatives of various national bodies as well as of the municipal
government. The war changed the physical facts; Israel was in control of all
Jerusalem and new goal became the state’s desire to quickly establish its permanent
control over the unified city. Torgovnik comments that to expect planning under
these circumstances to be solely based on local urban or professional considerations
is unrealistic (p.140). The new conditions created a conflict between the planners and
the national government politicians, ministries, and the government as whole, thus
resulting in parallel planning. Parallel planning has dominant political motivations.
Torgovnik describes it as the competition of interests between the central and local
actors; “Under parallel planning policy in Jerusalem a number of organizations made
efforts to halt each other’s initiation efforts and alternatively to advance their
own”(1990:140).
Schattschneider notes that a stronger conflict tends to overshadow a lesser
conflict. In Jerusalem at that time, the stronger conflict was generated by the
government’s efforts to expand the Jewish population of the city rapidly and the
lesser conflict for the government was over planning procedures and professional
planning norms (Torgovnik 1990:142).
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1968 Master Plan was prepared to create physical conditions that would
enable comfortable, pleasant and efficient urban activities, and to design the city in a
way that would be consistent with Jerusalem’s status as the capital of Israel and a
holy city. Planned by the consultant architects, the goal of pleasant and efficient
living meant that the planners did not approach the planning differently from that any
other city. However, the planners proceeded as though specific goals were agreed
upon while it is common for planning policy that affects so many people and
interested to be defined vaguely (Torgovnik 1990:142). Levin suggests that
unspecific goals allow planners to treat the planning process as purely technical, nonpolitical (Torgovnik 1990:145).
Jean Luc Pepin’s article shifts the focus to Canadian Federalism (1992).
He suggests that the Cyprus case is similar to Canada and a possible federalism could
work in Cyprus. In addition he pinpoints the importance of leadership for making
certain decisions regarding the future of a country and in the case of Canada,
agreeing to sign Canadian federalism. First, he defines the factors of diversity as
geography, physical, human and economic; ethnicity; languages; legal systems;
religious; and cultures. A higher degree of diversity in the population increases the
acceptability of a federal system whereas too high or too low a degree decreases it.
“Federal state begins with a core of agreements among leaders and communities
which are not expected to be perfect” (Salem 1992:127). Pepin states that common
interest, respect, fear and common sense were the psychological conditions of the
Canadian Federal State. “These attitudes must first find their incarnation in leaders”
(p.129). According to Pepin, the leaders involved in the Canadian Federalism “had
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brains, drive, imagination and they were realistic” (p.130). Besides psychological
factors, there are factors of philosophy that are as important. Mainly, vision,
tolerance, spirit of compromise amongst the leaders and in the communities, “the
need, the knowledge and the will must combine” (p.130). This is quite contradictory
to Torgovnik’s angle of view “patriotism, and nationalism, not urbanism dominated
the planning of Jerusalem” (Torgovnik 1990:150).
The social- psychological analysis of conflict escalation has received
significant input from over forty years of theorizing and research by Morton Deutsh
(Salem 192:247). The major contribution has been the specification of the differences
between a co-operative and a competitive social interaction. The basic idea is that the
approach that parties take to their relationship in terms of perceptions, attitudes,
communication and task orientation will in large part determine the nature and
outcomes of their relationship. In a cooperative interaction the parties see that they
have positively related goals, and hold friendly, trusting and helpful attitudes toward
each other (Salem 1992). In a competitive interaction, the parties perceive negatively
related goals. They are sensitive to differences, and hold suspicious, hostile and
exploitative attitudes (Salem 1992:247). Ronald J. Fisher suggests that most
intergroup relations are ‘mixed-motive’ situations, that is, involving both cooperative and competitive elements, it is extremely important which approach the
parties take since this determines the predominant nature and outcome of the
interaction. In a co-operative interaction the communication is open, accurate and
relevant whereas in a competitive interaction, it is limited, non-existent, misleading
and used for propaganda and espionage. Task orientation in a co-operative interaction
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addresses conflict as a mutual problem to be solved, whereas in a competitive
interaction, each party attempts to impose its solution through coercion and
escalation (Salem 1992:248). Deutsch extends his analysis by formulating his “crude
law of social interaction”, where co-operation breeds co-operation while competition
breeds competition (Salem 1992). This is in line with the almost universal norm of
reciprocity in human relations where one tends to get what one gives. In the case of
Cyprus, Fisher concludes that many of the elements of the competitive interaction
have been present throughout recent history.
In the history of Cyprus, going back to dates when the Turkish Cypriots and
the Greek Cypriots coexisted on the island, there are examples of cooperation as well
as competition. In its history certain events manipulated these outcomes.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Jean Luc Pepin suggests that Canada and Cyprus both have the required
preconditions for federalism. Canada became a federal state in 1876 by the “North
American Act”, the first federal document o the Canadian constitution. Pepin also
suggests that Cyprus can learn from the Canadian federalism. Pepin states that there
are three sets of pre-conditions (or factors) that has affected and still affects the
Canadian federalism:
•

Geographic and cultural conditions, fostering diversity

•

Psychological and philosophical conditions, fostering unity

•

Constitutional conditions put together by politicians.
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According to Luc de Pepin, philosophical factors such as ‘vision, tolerance, spirit
of compromise’ amongst the leaders and in the communities are equally important. In
his description of the Canadian Federalism he concludes that for a federation to form
‘the need, the knowledge and the will must combine’. (Salem 1992:130) According
to Pepin, the leaders involved in the Canadian Federalism “had brains, drive,
imagination and they were realistic” (p.130). Besides psychological factors, there are
factors of philosophy that are as important. Mainly, vision, tolerance, spirit of
compromise amongst the leaders and in the communities, “the need, the knowledge
and the will must combine” (p.130).
In my analysis of the Nicosia Master Plan I am using Pepin's theory and suggesting
that for the successful cooperation on the Nicosia Master Plan the Pepin’s
preconditions must exist, most importantly the psychological and philosophical
preconditions: vision, spirit, common sense, need, will and knowledge.
In the making of the Nicosia Master Plan the need for a structured city and
the will of the leadership created a successful cooperation between the Turkish
Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot municipalities of Nicosia. The pressing need (initially
for a sewage system) and the political will worked together with the leadership of the
unifying Mayors. Unifying leadership can be defined as Pepin’s philosophical
factors: a vision, tolerance, and spirit of compromise amongst the leaders. The
pressing need can be defined as a political, social or economical condition (problem)
that is in need of an improvement for the communities of Cyprus. Political will can
be defined as the attitude of the governments towards cooperation.
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In this case study analysis, the final goal will be applying these factors that
worked in making the Nicosia Master Plan to today’s conditions in Cyprus towards
the settlement of the Cyprus problem. The European Union membership is only an
incentive for both sides to speed up the process of finding an agreeable solution on
the island before the EU accession on May 1, 2004.

Operational Definitions
In 1976, there was a pressing need for a sewage system in the capital city,
Nicosia. The sewage system that was being built in 1970's was not completed
because of armed conflict and the physical division in 1974. The plant of the system
stayed on the North of the green line which was occupied by Turkish Cypriots and
the Greek Cypriots on the South had two options: either build another one or
cooperate with the Turkish Cypriot side complete and utilize the existing one. The
political will became evident when the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot
leaders, Mr. Denktas and Mr. Kleridis, did not oppose to the cooperation on a shared
sewage system, not helping the process in any way but also not blocking it. The
unifying leadership showed itself in the cooperative attitudes of the two Mayors at
the time: Mustafa Akinci and Lellos Demetriades, the Turkish Cypriots mayor and
the Greek Cypriot mayor respectively. These two men took initiative to work
together for a common sewage system for the city and when the project was
completed successfully they took on a bigger challenge and developed a master plan
for the city with United Nations Development Project (UNDP) aide.
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Today, there is a pressing need for the Turkish Cypriots to be economically
comfortable and have their government internationally recognized. The Greek
Cypriots on the other hand need to have a political stability on the island as well as in
the region in addition to the property issue; 39% of the island is under the control of
the North Cyprus. Today joining EU seems to be the answer to the pressing needs of
both sides. The question is whether a political will could and would emerge under the
current conditions.

METHODOLOGY
Research Question
What factors allowed for the successful development of the Nicosia master Plan? Can
these factors form the basis for additional agreements in solving the Cyprus Problem
before the island joins the European Union?

Research Hypothesis
The successful development of the Nicosia Master Plan was due to political will,
mutual needs and unifying leadership that existed on the North and the South of the
island at that time.

Research Design
The research comes mostly from secondary data which includes books, articles, and
official documents on the Nicosia Master Plan obtained from the Turkish Cypriot
Municipality in Nicosia, United Nation reports and published materials obtained
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from Mr. Akinci and Mr. Demetriades. The primary data comes from my informal
conversations with Mr. Mustafa Akinci, the former mayor of the Turkish part of
Nicosia and Mr. Lellos Demetriades, the former Mayor of the Greek part of Nicosia.
On July 2001 I visited Cyprus and this gave me the opportunity to engage in personal
conversations with Mustafa Akinci where I asked a lot of questions with the intention
of getting a more personal insight on the matter. I asked questions which focused on
his personal thoughts and feelings on the Nicosia Master Plan; what made this plan
come about; what was expected of this plan; how did he become involved with this
project; what was the agreements, and disagreements between the sides; how were
these resolved; what were the positions of the Turkish Cypriot side and the Greek
Cypriot side; what was his political views at that time; his thoughts on the third party
involvement; what made this project succeed; did his expectations in the beginning
matched the end result; if the boundaries were to be removed would Nicosia be a
unified city; in addition to the infrastructure of the city, how could the people of
Cyprus be united.
I did not have the opportunity to talk with Lellos Demetriades because he resides in
the Greek side and as a Turkish Cypriot I could not cross the borders. However, he
was kind enough to allow me to ask him the same questions over email in 2002.

DATA ANALYSIS
Introduction of Nicosia
Nicosia, the capital city, was established in the center of Cyprus, flatland called the
Mesaoria Plain. Over the centuries, the city has been a living legacy of the island’s

21
rich heritage and contains some of its finest examples of Byzantine, Venetian, French
Medieval and Ottoman architecture. The mixture of cultures that shaped Cyprus’
unique identity has also contributed to its turbulent history as it still continues today
(UNDP).
“Nicosia became the capital in the 11th century. A capital in the inland instead
of a coastal area as it was before is due to the need primarily to be as far as
possible or at equivalent distance from the sea and points of access to the island
because of attacks and the importance accorded to the territory in which the
settlement becomes the center” (Diaz-Berrio 1982:3).
The physical separation of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot
communities that had started in the 1950s became more solidified in the 1960s. In
1974 Nicosia was broken in two through its historic and cultural heart- the ancient
inner Walled City; a massive 16th century Venetian Wall. This circular stone
monument, five kilometers in circumference, has around its perimeter eleven
projecting bastions that form a many-pointed star. Within its limits lies Old Nicosia
with narrow meandering streets, lined with slender palms and latticed windows,
medieval churches, Gothic archways and skyward-reaching minarets (UNDP).
Nicosia is the center of urban activity in Cyprus. In the last century the city’s
role as administrative, commercial and cultural center of the island has been
strengthened. Despite the growth of Greater Nicosia, the historic core of the Walled
City had been dying. Several problems have accompanied the rapid growth of
Greater Nicosia. According to the diagnosis by international specialists, first is the
unplanned, uncontrolled and wasteful nature of urban sprawl that was pulling the city
outward in many directions. The second is the reality of human partition (UNDP).
The buffer zone that cuts through the Walled City is a daily reminder of division,
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encouraging the unrestrained growth of two separate parts deteriorating the historical,
cultural and architecturally valuable areas. In addition, lack of interest, lack of
necessary funding and legislation also added to the unplanned development. (Akinci,
interview) The Nicosia Master Plan was created to end the deterioration of the city
and the making of it represents more than its purpose: cooperation between the two
communities, goodwill of leadership and a step forward towards a unified city.

Evidence of Unifying Leadership
“The Nicosia Master Plan reflects the courageous vision of Lellos Demetriades and
Mustafa Akinci- the former Mayors, respectively, of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot communities of Nicosia. While both leaders looked forward to a common
solution to the political crisis they believed that no time should be lost in dealing with
the immediate problems of the day, reversing the decay and centrifugal growth of the
city.” (UNDP)
Through my informal dialogues with Mr. Demetriades and Mr. Akinci, I
learned that the idea of the Nicosia Master Plan came about right after the successful
agreement and partial implementation of the sewage system (Akinci, interview). The
attempt to set up and coordinate a joint sewage system started in 1977.
“At that time Nicosia had no central sewage system however, one was under
construction by the Greek Cypriot municipality of Nicosia. Its completion was
expected at the end of 1974. When 1974 events took place and the division
followed it with the agreement of a cease-fire, some parts of the main trunk
sewer, which was passing through the middle of the Walled City, and the
Treatment plant itself that was in Haspolat (Miamilia) (east of Nicosia) was left
in the North. This system was referred as the kidneys of the city and unless
there was an agreement with the Turkish side, the work that was started could
not have been completed. Of course other alternatives were possible for the
Greek Cypriot side such as building another treatment plant elsewhere.
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Although this option would have been theoretically valid, in practice the
existing treatment plant was located at the best place topographically available”
(Akinci,interview).
Akinci sees that cooperating rather than opting for other alternatives was more
economic and realistic for the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore they were going to finish
an unfinished project for which they were collecting immovable property tax and
sewage tax.
“In my mind, there was no alternative because it would have been illogical to allow a
modern public sewage system remain unused” (Demetriades, interview).
For the Turkish Cypriot side, cooperation for the completion of the plant and
in the meantime reaching compromises on the inclusion of the Northern part of
Nicosia into the system was the main objective because of the existing health hazard.
Due to the lack of project funds and the status of the northern part vis a vis the
international community, the North was not in a condition to start such a project
solely depending on its own resources. Therefore, cooperation initially was a result of
a mutual and a pressing need, which created a win-win situation for both sides.
Three years after the events of 1974, Mr. Demetriades and Mr. Akinci, met
for the first time at Mr. Demetriades’ house in the South. This was the very first
bilateral meeting to take place excluding those between the political leaders of both
sides, after 1974. Mr. Demetriades remembers the first post-war meeting between
Mr. Rauf Denktas (the Turkish Cypriot leader) and Mr. Cleridis (the Greek Cypriot
leader):
“When the personal Representative of the UN Secretary General invited the
two leaders for the first time, I also managed to get myself invited there. This was
the first time they met after the events. I know Mr. Denktas and Mr. Cleridis well all
of us are lawyers and practiced law together years ago. They both have a sense of
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humor; I should say rather peculiar at times but it’s there. We had a nice dinner and
after we finished I said to Mr. Denktas in a meaningful and sinister way: ‘Rauf, don’t
you think that you need a sewerage system and we also do? He smiled in a cunning
way for he understood what I meant. Then I continued: ‘look, it’s a pity, both of us
need a sewerage system and the system is there but is not functioning so why don’t
we do something about it? We all need it.’ So they started laughing and Glafkos said
‘here is that fool again with his funny ideas’ and they both agreed that we do
something about it. That was, believe it or not, how an agreement was reached which
could not be reversed afterwards. That is how later on we could arrange a meeting
between Mr. Akinci and myself.” Political will was there because Denktash did not
try to block this cooperation mainly because the Turkish side was in big need of a
sewage system (Demetriades 1998).
In 1976 Mr. Akinci was elected as the Mayor of Northern Nicosia. He was
informed about the initiative for cooperation on the sewerage project at the end of
1977. He states:
“There were some initial talks at the central government level. Apparently
Mr. Lellos Demetriades was in a difficult situation. For many years he was collecting
taxes from the inhabitants in the South to provide them sewerage facilities and in
addition his municipality had received a loan from the World Bank to implement the
project yet after 1974 the work had stopped. He needed to find a solution and was
seeking ways. Also the World Bank was sending its representatives to the island
trying to find a way out. The UNDP and the UN in Cyprus also found themselves in
an awkward position. The very first meeting with my involvement took place at the
house of Mr. Demetriades at the end of 1977. The resident representative of UNDP
then took us across the green line in his car together with my colleagues. At that
meeting I became aware that there was a draft agreement already prepared for the
completion of Phase I of the sewerage system. I found that the draft didn’t give the
Turkish side its fair share out of this project. I had three additional points I wanted to
include in the draft: to include the preparation of the working drawings of the central
parts of Northern Nicosia, to share the operation costs of the plant in proportion to
the usage and, to bring experts to examine ways for the fulfillment of the effluent
which was to be discharged into the Pedios - Kanlidere River. My involvement at the
very beginning created uneasiness on the part of the Greek Cypriots, UNDP and the
World Bank representatives. Since there was a draft agreement (which I didn’t know)
they thought that the Turkish Cypriot (TC) mayor was creating obstacles. In fact, I
was trying to create a just foundation for a fruitful cooperation” (Akinci, interview).
Mr. Akinci recognized that the two communities were living next to each
other in the same city which needed development on both sides (more on the Turkish
side) and infrastructure projects such as sewerage was a must for the city. "There was
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a buffer zone in between however; health hazards do not recognize any borders"
(Akinci). Pedious (Kanlidere) River was a health hazard for the Turkish side.
Without any pre-treatments the effluent was discharged from the flour, milk and soft
drink factories, which all three are within close proximity to each other. The
discharge from these factories was going into the riverbed that runs through
neighborhoods.
“Cooperation was not an easy job. Taking into consideration that this was
happening only after three years after the tragic events when the country was in
turmoil and, traumas were fresh, it wasn’t considered clever to meet the other side”
(Akinci, interview). “In the case of Nicosia, the presence of a third party was a must.
The role of the UN was of paramount importance. Without the presence and positive
role of the UN and its organizations, like UN Development Programs (UNDP), UN
Center for Human Settlements (HABITAT) and UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) we
couldn’t be able to come together” (Akinci, interview).
The two mayors had their disagreements, some trivial and others more
significant but they looked for ways to find alternative solutions. The biggest
obstacle they faced was the issue of recognition. The government in the South,
Republic of Cyprus, did not wish to act in any way, which implied the recognition of
a state in the North, therefore, the existence of two mayors. For them there was one
Nicosia and one mayor, which was the Greek Cypriot mayor. The Turkish Cypriot
side was within the limits of the 1960 Constitution, which envisioned that there
should be two municipalities in Nicosia with a coordinating committee in between,
consisting of councilors from both municipal councils. If the provisions of the 1960

26
Constitution were followed accordingly this would have not been a problem because
one of the provisions regarded creating separate municipalities in the major cities of
the island.
According to the 1960 Constitution “Separate municipalities shall be created in the
five largest towns of the Republic that is Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and
Paphos. The council of the Greek municipality in any such town shall be elected by
the Greek electors of the town and the council of the Turkish municipality by the
Turkish electors. A coordinating body shall be set up composed of two members
chosen by the council of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipality and a president
chosen by agreement between the two councils. Such coordinating body shall provide
for work which needs to be carried out jointly, shall carry out joint services entrusted
to it by agreement of the councils of the two municipalities within the town and shall
concern itself with matters which receive a degree of cooperation.” (1960
constitution, Article 173, p.159)
These provisions in the Constitution had never been implemented. The
Turkish Cypriot side was ready to accept the notion of two mayors but the Greek
Cypriot side was not in a position to do so. So the question was who were Mr.
Demetriades and Mr. Akinci? After some discussions in good faith to resolve the
issue and elaborate steps that they took to avoid press publicity, they agreed that
whoever they were, they were two persons representing their communities in matters
of Nicosia. They decided to choose a formula similar to the one used by Mr. Rauf
Denktas and Mr. Glafkos Clerides: the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community of
Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot community of Cyprus respectively. Mr. Akinci
became the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community of Nicosia and Mr.
Demetriades became the representative of the Greek Cypriot community of Nicosia.
The venue for the meetings was Ledra Palace Hotel at the buffer zone. It was a round
table meeting. The chairman was always the resident representative of UNDP. Sitting
on the right of the chairman was alternating at every meeting. (Demetriades, 1998)

27
This statement is taken from the UN minutes at the meeting when two representatives
came together under the chairmanship of Mr. Philip Marisic, UNDP Resident
Representative, on October 25, 1978:
“The meeting was held in an atmosphere of constructive cooperation and mutual
understanding at which both had expressed their satisfaction that this agreement for
the completion of the Nicosia sewerage project is being speedy and successfully
implemented.”
The recognition issue also created difficulties with the funding, which was
coming from international agencies. On this issue UN played a positive role and
assisted the parties. They went away from the central UN organization and got under
the umbrella of UNDP because UNDP was concerned with issues such as funding
and technicalities rather than political issues. UNDP, through the World Bank,
provided financial assistance. For instance when the sewerage system started to be
implemented the system constructor was a Turkish Cypriot. In order to receive
payments the funds were coming from Brussels since the Turkish Cypriot side did
not accept to receive the funds via the Greek Cypriot side. The money was going to
London into an account of Turkish Cypriot Cooperative Central Bank, which was the
official bank of the Turkish Municipality of Nicosia. Later the money was transferred
to North Cyprus to be paid to the contractor.
Both mayors took into consideration the prevailing political circumstances on
both sides. Since the Turkish Cypriot mayor belonged to the opposition the situation
in the North was not always helpful. The media was complaining about the bad smell
arising from the plant and the riverbed from time to time. Fingers were pointed at the

28
Mayor as the responsible person. The media was saying that he brought the Greek
Cypriot’s dirt to the Turkish Cypriot North forgetting that the factories in the North
were discharging their effluent without any treatment at all in the riverbed in the
midst of neighborhoods before they were connected to the system. Most of the media
was not trying to create favorable conditions for cooperation; instead they were
attacking the only project implemented jointly. According to Mr. Demetriades there
were adverse reactions and comments from the Greek Cypriot side as well. “When I
mentioned this effort I received scornful smiles… they would leave me alone
sometimes believing that the project would fail by itself” (Demetriades 1998).
The presence of a neutral party was necessary for setting up and facilitating
the negotiations. The negative part was the bureaucracy of the UN. The Mayors
stayed away from the formalities such as the decision not to keep minutes of their
meetings after the first three meetings with elaborate minutes taken by secretaries in
the presence of political and UN officer. From then on they only wrote down the
decisions made. Before the official meetings began the two mayors sat in a corner
and talked about the problems they were facing, and what was achievable. That way
they knew not to bring up something that was impossible to accomplish and kept it
for a later time. As a result they both more or less knew where they were going
before the meeting started. That way they didn’t set unrealistic goals and waste time.
For apparent reasons, they also tried to do their work in silence without attracting
constant media attention for the project would have been in jeopardy if it became an
issue for political discussion.
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It is important to notice that the solutions to the arising problems were pragmatic
approaches.
In 1980, the sewerage system was ready to operate. Without any prior
publicity certain units were connected to the system in the hope that those who might
disagree with this project would be reluctant to act against it once it became evident.
Places such as the Russian Embassy, the American Embassy, and the hospital on the
Greek side; Saray Hotel (the main hotel) in the North, the municipal market and 3
factories on the Turkish side were the first ones to be connected to the system.
Demetriades summarizes the factors of their success as trust; good faith; the
sense to reach practical solutions that were beneficial to both sides; staying away
from politics, and not talking too much to journalists (interview).
Akinci summarizes the main reason for success as two-fold: the most
important being the existence of a mutual need and as importantly the visions of the
leadership of the respective local authorities (interview).
A good example of practical solutions in good faith is clear in the accounts of
Ahmet Savas Orek, a Turkish Cypriot city planner who was a member of the Nicosia
Master Plan Team. He recalls that two major problems came up during the first phase
of the project. The first one was the names (of the cities, village and regions) on the
map. The Greek Cypriots opposed to using the names that were changed to Turkish
after 1963 and 1974. They wanted to use the old Greek names. At the end they
decided to use both names and solve the problem. The second problem was the use of
political trigger words in the brochures published by both sides. This time they tried
to use more technical than political terms.
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"The first pamphlet book published by UNDP on this project showed pictures
of the work being done in the city. An Italian photographer took the pictures that
would go in this pamphlet. When the Greek Cypriot Mayor saw it he said that he
could not go back to Cyprus now because the book makes Nicosia look like a
Muslim town because there were more pictures of mosques than churches. So, they
put one more church picture and a balance was achieved. The point is that even the
pictures were equal. This happened during a team visit to the United States at a hotel
room in 1981.”
“If the mayors both or one of them was not sharing the vision for mutual
benefit, and peaceful coexistence in a compromising mood, there might have not
been any cooperation at all." (Akinci, interview)

Evidence of Political Will
After the successful agreement and partial implementation of the sewage system the
idea of Nicosia Master Plan came about. Encouraged by this success the two mayors
decided to enter into a more challenging area, which at the same time was related to
the benefit of their citizens. Mr. Akinci, an architect himself and Mr. Demetriades felt
strongly about urban planning issues and the need of it in Nicosia. In a normal
situation master plan should have come before the infrastructure projects. Yet the
situation in Cyprus and Nicosia created the conditions to do the opposite. Sewage
was a pressing need and so was the planning. With the assistance of UNDP at that
time the two sides agreed to cooperate for such a major project. There were two main
goals: a Nicosia that could function independently while divided, and a city that
could function as a whole in a future reunification.
In Nicosia the major problem was the unplanned development. The city was
extending from North to South in an unplanned manner creating more infrastructure
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needs such as sewage, water, electricity, schools and transportation. There were
thousands of empty building lots in the built-up areas. The local authorities on both
sides were not happy with this situation. The green line passing through the walled
city of Nicosia prepared the ground for deterioration of the historical, cultural and
architecturally valuable area. However, besides the green line, the lack of interest,
lack of necessary funds and legislation but above all lack of a comprehensive plan
was adding to the destruction of the city. There was also a demand for a better traffic
system, a need for more green areas, and for zoning of the areas within the city. The
two mayors visited Venice together to ask for financial assistance for the restoration
of the Venetian walls of Nicosia. They also went to Berlin, which was divided then
and was an important experience for the mayors, a reality in which they did not want
to see their country. In order to avoid what happened in Berlin, museums and
beautiful buildings of East Berlin right next to the most depressed area of West
Berlin, they decided to create the Nicosia Master Plan, which would create a
smoother transition for the city. To integrate the two sides of Berlin required a lot of
money and effort. This problem would have been solved if it were taken care of
before the wall came down. The action for Nicosia Master Plan was taken under this
light, by learning from the mistakes of other countries.
The work of the Nicosia Master Plan teams began with an analysis of the
problems and projected trends. They utilized socioeconomic surveys, assessments of
physical structure, land use patterns, and existing legislation and other control
measures influencing urban growth. The teams concluded that in the absence of
substantial new investments and a whole set of planned and integrated actions,
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warehouses instead of houses would soon replace the heart of Nicosia, public
amenities would collapse and the young families would give way to elderly and
unemployed. To prevent this the teams drew up a blueprint, mapping out the
projected shape of the city to the end of the century, planning for green spaces,
designing traffic managements and pedestrian schemes, and identifying needed
zoning regulations and other controls. By agreeing on this framework, the two sides
started the second phase of the Nicosia Master Plan in 1984. (UNDP) The Nicosia
Master Plan Team was composed of architects, urban planners and sociologists from
both communities. On both sides there were two individual teams functioning as one
when they got together. In the technical teams all team members were Turkish
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Great attention was paid not to have any person from
the mainlands because at that time it was a sensitive issue. At times international staff
from HABITAT and UNDP was helping out with the project. The staff was also
selected to maintain neutrality. All staff had to be approved and accepted by both
sides. The two teams were under the supervision of the project manager. The two
technical teams also met under the presence of the project manager. The project
manager was Lube Pota who was from Skopje, Macedonia. Akinci states, “He did
not give us the impression that he favored either side. He was coordinating and trying
to be helpful to both sides to conclude the job” (interview). For different sectors
different international staff helped. Aware of the existing conflict between the two
sides, the international staff worked in cooperation. Akinci also stated that the
involvement of a third party, in this case UN, was very helpful:
“It was instrumental in bringing the two sides together as well as in putting
various inputs for different sectors of the NMP in the form of international expertise.
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When one considers that there was work to be completed in the sewage project in the
buffer zone, in narrow streets where soldiers of the two sides were stationed only 3
meters apart from each other, it will be clear to understand that without the presence
of UNFICYP work could not be carried out in those areas” (interview).
“Underlying the project-and its remarkable planning success so far is the idea
that close and systematic technical cooperation can foster new bonds of
understanding. Such linkage, it is believed, may help overcome the prevailing fear
and mistrust between the two communities.” (UNDP)
Two beautiful neighborhoods, Arab Ahmet (North of buffer zone) and
Chrysaliniotissa (South of buffer zone) were the first objects for renovation,
restoration and rehabilitation project; of housing and other physical structures,
redesigning of traffic patterns and creation of sidewalks, landscaping and community
facilities and services.
These neighborhoods were very rich with historical heritage and culture, also located
in the center of the city with easy access to the existing but dying business district.
(The vision for the future of Nicosia)
It is important to recognize that the bi-communal meetings on Nicosia Master
Plan continued even when the diplomatic talks between the two leaders came to a
dead end on many occasions throughout the process of Nicosia Master Plan. The
Nicosia Master Plan received the World Habitat Award in 1989.
In 1990 Mustafa Akinci resigned from his duty as a mayor after serving the
North Nicosia community for 14 years. The Nicosia Master Plan continued to work
with Lellos Demetriades and the new mayors who followed after Akinci left office
and more and more areas on both sides had been included into the sewage system,
which benefited more people. Lellos Demetriades resigned from his office in 2002. It
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is very sad to report that the Nicosia Master Plan, although had started 22 years ago,
has yet to be implemented fully due to the failure of solving the Cyprus Problem. In
addition, the political unwillingness, lack of determination, as well as conflicting
interests of certain influential sections of the Turkish Cypriot society prevented the
implementation of the Nicosia Master Plan in the North. It was only when Akinci
became an elected minister, responsible also for the city planning, that he was able to
put the plan into effect after necessary revision.
On May 9, 2003 Mustafa Akinci and Lellos Demetriades jointly received
prestigious Europa Nostra Medal of Honor “for their consistent, exemplary and
successful efforts, for the cause of the heritage of their common but divided city and
the benefit of all its citizens during particularly difficult times,” explained HRH the
Prince Consort of Denmark, President of Europa Nostra (Europa Nostra press
release). Europa Nostra is the pan-European federation for heritage, and the Medal of
Honor recognizes the merit of a sustained and exemplary contribution made by a
particular person to the protection and/or enhancement of Europe’s culture heritage,
both built and natural.
As a result, it can be summarized that the pressing need, the political will of
local authorities, and the collaboration and peace seeking leadership of the two
mayors brought about the first bicommunal project which created the visible
footsteps for others to follow towards a united Cyprus.
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Evidence of Mutual Need
The Incentives for the Turkish Cypriot Community. The analysis of the need factor
should be viewed form two perspectives: that of the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek
Cypriot communities and in terms of incentives. Under today’s circumstances it is a
fact that the need of a solution is more vital for the Turkish Cypriot side than the
Greek Cypriot side. Greek Cypriot side secured its membership to the European
Union and after May 1, 2004 their willingness to negotiate may diminish.

National Identity. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognized by
any country in the world except Turkey. This factor alone caused the Turkish
Cypriots to live in isolation from the rest of the world. Turkish Cypriots cannot travel
to any country except to Turkey with their Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
passport because it is not recognized. Countries like England and United States of
America give visas to Turkish Cypriots as Cypriot citizens, not as Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus citizens. In order to travel to other European countries it is
required by the embassies to hold a passport of Republic of Turkey, which can
receive a visa.
Turkish Cypriots have to use a mailing address, which has ‘Mersin 10
Turkey’ as the country address. Any letter, which is sent to North Cyprus or Cyprus,
will not reach the destination with the likelihood of reaching the hands of the Greek
Cypriot post offices. To call North Cyprus one still needs to dial the international
code for Turkey. All these may seem small components however they are the
components of national identity, personal identity as well as a stable society. If a
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solution is found the Turkish Cypriot community will become individually as well as
a community an EU member. Becoming an EU country in itself is a big incentive for
the TC community.
The exodus of many young and talented Turkish Cypriots has accelerated, as
immigrants from Turkey, with few ties to the local culture and no natural attachment
to the notion of Cypriot identity, replace them (Barkey and Gordon 2002). Turkish
Cypriots who left their country to pursue higher education in Europe and USA are
fearful of the lack of job opportunities they would face upon returning back to the
island therefore looking for employment or furthering their education that will enable
them to stay abroad. The ones who have stayed on the island look for ways to leave
the island in the pursuit of a better future. If the status quo persists the Turkish
Cypriots will disappear from the island through emigration by receiving the Republic
of Cyprus passports already available to them, which will make them individually,
not as a community, Europeans.

Economics. Barkey and Gordon state that in theory all parties to the Cyprus
problem have an incentive to reach a deal (2002). “On the Turkish side economic
conditions- brought about by a Greek Cypriot led embargo on its exports and
homegrown mismanagements and corruption-have assumed almost disastrous
proportions” (2002:6). In 2002, the estimated GDP in the north was 4500 Euro per
capita whereas this figure is 18,500 Euro in the south (EU website). The northern part
has no independent monetary policy and uses the Turkish Lira as its currency, which
makes it very vulnerable to the inflation and from economic crises that occurs in
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Turkey. The Turkish Cypriots are almost totally depending on mainland Turkey.
Exclusively Turkey pays for defense and infrastructure. There has been virtually no
foreign investment in the north since the island was divided and the north was not
recognized. Tourism is largely under utilized and trade is heavily dependent on the
Turkish market (EU website). The government is the biggest employer and investor
with the money coming from Turkey (Munur 2001). The south has intensified its
economic links to Europe during the last decade. Although the unstable economic
conditions in Turkey may seem to indicate that Turkish Cypriots cannot expect the
motherland to send financial help, support on all levels continues coming even today.

Security. EU accession may appear increasingly attractive to Turkish Cypriots who
are afraid of becoming a minority under Greek Cypriots. There are many people who
had been deeply affected during the years of unrest from both sides, who became
refugees in their own country. Although percentages may be low, they rightly view
the other community as ‘the enemy’ and do not trust them. They are afraid that Greek
Cypriots will violate any agreement whenever the opportunity arises like they did in
1963. It is important to mention here that doing such an act will not be as easy to
commit as it was many years ago because the rights and interests of both sides will be
protected through membership in EU. This brings to the surface the need of
community reconciliation and the importance of trust building measures in order to
create the long lost trust and good faith between the two communities.
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Self-Governance. Gaining a solution under EU umbrella would bring to Turkish
Cypriots the long-lost right to be the masters of their house. Ever since their
existence on the island Turkish Cypriots have always been mastered by other rulers.
Upon Turkey’s intervention in 1974, the Turkish Cypriots domestic affairs became
dependent on the motherland and north became a bargaining chip for Turkey in EU
affairs. Turkey has been very open, with her public media and politicians, supporting
Denktash for 30 years. Instead of following a logical and practical path to solution,
the Cyprus Problem has been a ‘national cause’ for the motherland. The Turkish
government including her military and civilian bureaucracy has interfered with every
election, thus maintaining the status quo. It is very ironic that although Turkey claims
to be the only country that recognizes Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, yet she
cannot send a soccer team to play with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
teams but she can send her teams to Larnaca (South) to attend an international
tournament (Rakoczy 2003). In other words, even Turkish motherland is not able to
recognize her so-called ‘yavruvatan’ a metaphor used by the Turkish government
when referring to Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. To name a few of Turkey’s
interference with north’s domestic issues: Turkish Cypriot Police Forces do not
belong to civilian authority but to Turkey’s military forces; the president of Central
Bank in North is appointed by Turkey; Turkish Cypriot Airline’s five member board
receives three board members appointed from Turkey; a Turkish Cypriot military
officer cannot be promoted beyond Colonel, highest ranking military officials are
appointed from Turkey (Rakoczy 2003). The most recent elections in December
2003, protests mobilized by mass numbers of Turkish Cypriots in 2003, and public
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polls show that the Turkish Cypriots are ready for a solution under EU which would
make them the masters of their state.
The incentive for the Turkish Cypriots to make a deal before the South joins
the EU is very crucial especially because their bargaining power would be weaker
after May 1, 2004. The Greek Cypriots already guaranteed a membership to the EU
with or without a solution to the problem, they may be less willing to negotiate a fair
partnership after the final accession to the Union as the Annan Plan suggests today.
Moreover, the inclusion of TCs in the EU would add Turkish as an official EU
language, which would in addition benefit Turkey’s eventual accession. (Rakoczy
2003:6)

The incentives for the Greek Cypriot Community
One cannot deny what the eye sees. Especially after the removal of the travel
restrictions in April 2003, which enable thousands of Turkish Cypriots travel to the
other side of the Green Line, the differences between the North and South became
clear as the Mediterranean Sea. Many people made analogies of the North to a
Middle East country and South to a European point of attraction for more than 2.5
million young and old tourists every year.
As it he situation stands today, the Republic of Cyprus will be a member of
the EU in May 2004 as the sole beneficiary on the island unless there is a solution
between the sides before this date. At the 1999 Helsinki summit, EU stated clearly
for the first time that the end of the island’s division was not a precondition to
membership (Barkey and Gordon 2002). An EU Commission spokesman also told
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Reuters: “We assume and we work very hard for this that there will be a political
agreement before accession. This remains our preferred option. We continue to work
on the basis of the conclusions of the Helsinki summit which called for political
agreement over Cyprus but without making this a precondition for membership”
(Christou 2001).
The EU and the Greek Cypriot officials have said repeatedly that many
opportunities were missed to sign an agreement throughout the 29 years of dispute
and namely the last peace plan presented by Kofi Annan. Many analysts and
politicians agreed that this plan could have been accepted as a basis to start the
negotiation towards a viable solution. “The Annan Plan has serious flaws but is a
good basis for negotiations” (Larigakis 2003). Without going into a further detail on
the plan in this case study, whether Cypriot or not, many agree that the time has come
for a solution and joining under the EU will only increase the credibility and security
of a lasting solution.
Having said this, one may think that the incentives for Greek Cypriots may not be as
strong as it is for Turkish Cypriots for a solution. There are some data that proves it
otherwise.

Security. The need factor is evident for both sides. Safety and security for Greek
Cypriots is a leading factor. According to George Vassiliou, the former president of
Republic Of Cyprus, and former Chief negotiator for the accession of Cyprus, the
Greek Cypriots are afraid that although they form the majority within Cyprus, they
are a small minority compared to Turkey (2003). Just like Turkish Cypriots, Greek
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Cypriots also maintain distrust, and fear of Turkey who according to their perspective
took over 1/3 of the island and still occupies the North. This denies many Greek
Cypriots of their properties that they left in the North. When Cyprus joins the EU the
size will not be as important for they will all comprise one nation under EU
(Vassiliou 2003). Eventual demilitarization with immediate reduction in Turkish
troops in the North, and peace settlement with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots will
diminish the security concerns.

Land and Refugees. According to Nathalie Tocci (2003), Greek Cypriots gains
would not be in terms of status or economic. Because any agreement would entail
extensive power sharing, where Republic Of Cyprus would not be the only legal
government, economic redistribution for the purposes of balancing living standards
between the communities. Yet, she believes, Greek Cypriots have much to gain in
terms of territory. The Annan Plan calls for Turkish Cypriot federated state to include
28.2 percent and the Greek Cypriot federated state for the remaining 71.8 percent of
the new republic. In addition nearly 90,000 Greek Cypriot refugees could go back to
their homes in the territory, which would be returned to the Greek Cypriots; another
50,000 would be able to go back to the Turkish Cypriot state over a period of 15
years. When Turkey joins EU, all limitations on the return of refugees to their
villages and land would be lifted (Vassiliou 2003:2).
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The paramount question that needs to be asked is, do the factors that existed for the
Nicosia Master Plan exist today for a unified island to join the European Union? Is
there a pressing mutual need that could push the sides to come together for a
solution? Do the same or similar political dynamics that were present for the creators
of the Nicosia Master Plan exist for unified accession today? Is there a political will
that visions the end of this problem either in Cyprus, Turkey or in other influential
countries? Is there trust and good faith between the two communities of Cyprus?
After answering these questions it will be easier to see the clear picture that the island
reflects under today’s conditions.
Today, the Cyprus Problem is very close to be solved simply because of the
EU factor. Turkey finally seems to be determined to join the EU, and solving the
Cyprus Problem would be one of the conditions affecting Turkey’s membership.
Furthermore, if Cyprus goes into EU divided, Turkey’s future attempts for
membership will not only be vetoed by Greece but also by the Republic of Cyprus.
Mr. Denktash still continues to be against a solution, wanting to join EU only when
Turkey is ready to do so. In reality Turkey has all the power and decision making
ability on behalf of North and Turkish Cypriot leader’s negative attitudes are the very
opposite of the peace minded visions of the Mayors.
After the last parliamentary elections on December 14, 2003, a new coalition
was established in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus parliament. A left wing,
peace-supporting party replaced a very hardline right wing party as the major party in
the parliament. No matter how much this seems to increase the likelihood of a
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solution, the fact that the coalition was established with Denktash’s party maintains
the suspicions of a positive outcome. However the majority of the Turkish Cypriots
are in favor of a solution and although solution of the Cyprus Problem is not a
precondition for Turkey’s candidacy to the EU, supporting efforts to resolve the
Cyprus Problem seem to be a strong incentive for Turkey’s eventual accession to the
Union.
Unlike the Nicosia Master Plan, the neutral third parties such as the UN and
the EU being the primary initiators, efforts of governments of the United States and
United Kingdom are also amongst the initiators of bicommunal talks between the
leaders. The vision that was beheld by the Mayors of Nicosia had not yet been mutual
at any time period for the leaders in power. One difference regarding the third party
involvement is that when Nicosia Master Plan was in progress UN and UNDP were
utilized as a means to come together and to provide facilitation. The recent talks have
been pressed upon parties more on Turkish Cypriot side than the Greek Cypriot side.
Not only did the leaders not manage to come together on their own terms, they also
couldn’t exhibit the trust, good faith and peace seeking leadership, which made the
Nicosia Master Plan a success.

RECOMMENDATIONS
I.

The Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders should continue
negotiations on the basis of Annan Plan with a constructive and positive
manner towards a solution, not a non-solution; should do most if not all
the revisions of the presented plan without not leaving mush work for
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Turkey and Greece to complete as guarantor powers on behalf of the 2
sides.
II.

The TC negotiating team should not only include the present prime
minister, deputy prime minister and the president; but also include
political party leaders who have been pro-solution and pro-unified island.

III.

The efforts of bringing the two communities together to break the mental
barriers should continue with local support as well as the international
support that was been offered during the days of physical barriers.

IV.

The Turkish Cypriots should lobby at international forums and tell their
story to create alliances to accomplish their desire of a democratized,
European standard future.

V.

The Turkish Cypriot and Turkish administrations should listen to the
voice and votes of the people and let the Turkish Cypriot community use
their sole right of referendum as set for April 2004.

CONCLUSION
The author concludes that although the unifying vision of the leadership factor that
existed in Nicosia Master Plan does not exist in today’s conditions, solution is yet a
very strong possibility because of other factors at work. The need factor does exist on
both sides for similar conditions necessary for both sides’ survival and welfare.
It is the expectation and undying hope of this author that once the Cyprus
Problem comes to an end, many Cypriots, no matter Greek or Turkish, will return to
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the island where they will be able to create a future for themselves and will put every
effort to bring the two communities closer.
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